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Dolzani: Can I Be Arrested for Being Annoying?

DEFINING THE LINE BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED SPEECH AND TRUE THREATS: CAN I BE
ARRESTED FOR BEING ANNOYING?
CRIMINAL COURT OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK CITY
People v. Brodeur1
(decided July 18, 2013)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution states, “[c]ongress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech.”2 This proclamation grants all citizens a right to free speech, and case law has
demonstrated how this fundamental right cannot be easily abridged.
For example, one court held, “[t]he First Amendment of the United
States Constitution forbids the silencing of speech merely because it
is objectionable or offensive to the listener.”3 Only “well-defined and
narrowly limited classes [of speech] . . . including the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting words
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace may properly be proscribed.”4 New York’s
Aggravated Harassment statute, which authorizes a limitation on free
speech, states:
[a] person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the
second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy,
threaten or alarm another person, he or she . . . [e]ither
(a) communicates with a person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, by telegraph, or by mail, or by
1
2
3
4

969 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Crim. Ct. 2013).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
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transmitting or delivering any other form of written
communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance
or alarm.5
Even though a majority of New York case law holds that New York’s
Aggravated Harassment Statute is in compliance with the First
Amendment, some federal and New York courts have held that the
statute is unconstitutional.6
The parties in Brodeur, complainant Harry Stuckey and defendant Christopher Brodeur, decided to enter into a lease of a loft
space in Williamsburg, New York.7 At this time, Brodeur and Stuckey had known each other for over ten years and had experienced difficulty working with each other in the past.8 Brodeur was known to
be a person with a “propensity for exaggeration of every perceived
wrong.”9 Nevertheless, the two leased the space in order to use it for
their artistic work, storage, events, and parties.10 Brodeur originally
located the space and raised the initial rent and security required by
the landlord.11 However, Brodeur lacked the full financial resources
to satisfy the landlord, so he turned to Stuckey to finance the lease.12
The lease was executed in January of 2009 without Brodeur’s name
on the lease.13
Shortly thereafter, a dispute arose as to who possessed control
of the lease.14 Stuckey argued that he had sole control since his name
was on the lease, while Brodeur believed he was in control of the
lease because of his initial undertakings to obtain it.15 Brodeur attempted to exercise his control when he moved into one of the rooms,
5

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30(1) (McKinney 2012).
See infra sections III.B, IV.A for cases that held Aggravated Harassment statute unconstitutional.
7
Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
8
Id. at 779.
9
Id. at 781. The court also took note of Brodeur’s endeavors as “muckraker” because he
was arrested numerous times due to protests. Stuckey was well aware of Brodeur’s behavioral tendencies because he stated anyone who was a subject of Brodeur’s ire was labeled a
child molester and a rapist. Id.
10
Id. at 776, 779.
11
Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 776, 779.
12
Id. at 776. Stuckey agreed to lease the space in the name of a corporation, V. Media
Inc., of which he was President. Id.
13
Id. at 779.
14
Id. at 776.
15
Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 779. Stuckey testified he had control of the lease because he
personally guaranteed the corporate obligations to the landlord, which made him personally
liable on the rent. Id.
6
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and, in turn, Stuckey moved into the premises as well.16 About one
month after the lease was signed, Stuckey removed Brodeur from the
premises by the means of self-help and changed the locks to the
property.17
After Brodeur’s ejectment, animosity between the parties
spiked when Brodeur stated he would kill Stuckey if Brodeur was not
returned to occupancy or given control of the premises.18 During this
time, Brodeur also placed a poster on a door of another residence of
Stuckey’s, which stated: “Wanted! Call 911 if you see this man! His
name is Harry Stuckey and he is a violent drug dealer and child molester/rapist. Call 911.”19 Brodeur was charged with Attempted Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree because of his verbal
threats to kill Stuckey and the written threats of the poster.20
The court decided that, in regard to the threats, a mixed question of law and fact would determine Brodeur’s guilt under the statute.21 The court held as a matter of law, Brodeur’s verbal statements
threatening to kill Stuckey amounted to a true threat.22 However, the
court then analyzed Brodeur’s verbal statements under a contextual
approach by scrutinizing the rocky relationship of the parties, the evidence of Brodeur’s propensity to exaggerate in various situations,
and Stuckey’s own reaction to the statements to support its finding
that the First Amendment protected the verbal threats.23
The court concluded the poster was a true threat. 24 As a matter of law, Brodeur’s admission that he placed the poster on Stuck16

Id. This caused further friction between the parties because Brodeur did not want
Stuckey to occupy the other room as Brodeur wanted to lease out the remaining rooms to
raise money for rent. Id.
17
Id. at 779.
18
Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 779-80. It is important to note the context of the situation in
which the comments were made. Several witnesses who heard Brodeur’s statements about
Stuckey were Board members who the court stated had no legal authority. Id. “The testimony of several witnesses was that the “Board” meetings were more akin to parties, with the
participants being in various states of intoxication.” Id. at 780.
19
Id. at 783.
20
Id. at 776. Brodeur was also charged with Stalking in the Fourth Degree (N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 120.45(3) (McKinney 2012)) and Harassment in the Second Degree (N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 240.26(2) (McKinney 2012)). Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 776. The stalking charge is
not an issue in this article.
21
Id. at 778.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 779-83. For a further discussion of the court’s contextual analysis regarding
Brodeur’s verbal threats, see infra section II.D.
24
Id. at 784.
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ey’s door constituted a true threat.25 In context, the poster also exemplified a true threat because a reasonable person in Stuckey’s position would be alarmed upon viewing the poster because it would put
the person in apprehension of harm, and the court stated that Stuckey
himself was annoyed and afraid because of the unknown consequences of the poster.26
The process of determining whether a person’s conduct
amounts to a true threat requires a full contextual analysis and an understanding of the implications of limiting a person’s speech under
the First Amendment. The issue here is not just whether a person is
guilty under New York’s Aggravated Harassment statute, but, more
broadly, how certain acts cross the barrier from protected speech under the First Amendment to unprotected speech subject to criminal
penalty.
II.

THE COURT’S REASONING

The court in Brodeur assumed New York’s Aggravated Harassment statute was constitutional on its face, but it recognized the
delicate balance between protecting a person’s First Amendment
right and correctly applying the statute to the situation before it.27
The court noted that when a person’s free speech is at issue, the application of a legitimate restriction on free speech requires an analysis
as a matter of law and of fact.28 For the factual analysis, the court in
Brodeur brought an objective and subjective contextual approach to
determine the true intent of the defendant.29
A.

Elements of Guilt Under the Statute – What Is a
“True Threat”?

“A genuine threat is one that is serious, should reasonably
have been taken to be serious, or was confirmed by other words or

25

Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
Id. For a further discussion of the court’s contextual analysis regarding the poster
threats, see infra section II.D.
27
Id. at 776, 777 (“The evidence in this case raises multiple issues, most importantly the
juxtaposition of the statutes at issue with the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the right of Defendant to free speech.”).
28
Id. at 778.
29
See infra section II.C.1-2.
26
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conduct.”30 Further, conduct or speech is considered a true threat if
the speaker intends to invoke fear or violence upon the listener.31 Societal norms and policies carry some weight when considering
whether certain speech amounts to a true threat, but just because
speech may be objectionable, it does not necessarily mean it is proscribed under the law.32 True threats are also clear, unambiguous,
and immediate; there should not be an element of vagueness or uncertainty for an action to be considered proscribed speech.33
B.

True Threat Determination Under the Statute – A
Mixed Question of Law and Fact

When analyzing whether speech or conduct constitutes a true
threat, the court in Brodeur looked to federal and state case law to determine its own approach. The court noted that a person’s protection
under the First Amendment is not abridged when looking at narrowly
limited classes of prohibited speech.34 Proscribable speech is “lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting
words’ . . . that may incite an immediate breach of the peace.”35
When conducting an analysis as a matter of law, true threats may be
found in numerous phrases that people say throughout their daily
lives when looking at the words alone. As the court in Brodeur stated, an angry baseball fan shouting “kill the umpire” may be considered a true threat as a matter of law due to the face value of the
words.36 But, when considering the severity of a limitation on a person’s First Amendment right, a literal interpretation of an individual’s
30

Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (quoting People v. Hernandez, 795 N.Y.S.2d 862, 866
(Crim. Ct. 2005)).
31
Id. (quoting People v. Olivio, 800 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Crim. Ct. 2005)).
32
Id. at 776 (regarding the defendant’s burning the American flag at a political demonstration; although the defendant’s action was arguably morally condemnable speech, the
court found the conduct did not threaten to destroy free speech) (citing Johnson, 491 U.S. at
414).
33
Id. (citing People v. Yablov, 706 N.Y.S.2d 591, 595 (Crim. Ct. 2000)).
34
Id.; see also Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
35
Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (noting that various courts have also looked at whether
the defendant’s speech contained “fighting words”) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 57172). Fighting words “are likely to cause a fight. So are threatening, profane or obscene
revilings.” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20
(1971) (noting that fighting words are “those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to
provoke violent reaction.”).
36
Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
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speech may not be the only basis of determination.37

C.

Context – A Way To Fill in the Gray Area of the
Law

Federal and state case law has portrayed different courts applying a contextual analysis in its true threat analysis. Many “lewd”
or “obscene” words may fall into the definition of a true threat as a
matter of law, but when taken into context, determining the true
meaning of obscene speech brings a new level of analysis. 38 In People v. Dietze,39 the New York Supreme Court took a very narrow approach in its application of the statute.40 In this case, the defendant
made various statements calling the complainant a “bitch” and her
son a “dog.”41 The defendant also stated that he would “beat up” the
complainant one day or night, but this evidence was not enough to
place the defendant’s conduct within the confines of the statute.42
The court first held speech is not forbidden unless it presents
a clear and present danger of some serious substantive evil.43 The
court relied on a more descriptive meaning of a “true threat,” in
which a “substantive evil” seemed to denote a more serious and indepth definition of a true threat.44 This definition was considerably
narrower than the meaning accorded by the federal courts to a true
threat, which was “lewd” and “obscene” speech.45 Second, the court
found a contextual examination facilitated making a well-versed de37

Id.
Id. at 778.
39
549 N.E.2d 1166 (N.Y. 1989).
40
Id. at 1168, 1173-74.
41
Id. at 1167. The court also noted that the defendant’s actions were directed towards the
complainant and her son, who were both mentally disabled. Id. It also commented that the
defendant knew of their mental disabilities, and had been warned by police on a prior occasion to refrain from arguing with them again. Id.
42
Dietze, 549 N.E.2d at 1167-70. “There is nothing in the record demonstrating that defendant's statement that she would ‘beat the crap out of [complainant] some day or night in
the street’ was either serious, should reasonably have been taken to be serious, or was confirmed by other words or acts showing that it was anything more than a crude outburst.” Id.
at 54.
43
Id. at 1168.
44
Id. at 1168. (“Speech is often ‘abusive’—even vulgar, derisive, and provocative—and
yet it is still protected under the State and Federal constitutional guarantees of free expression unless it is much more than that.”).
45
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
38
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cision regarding the true meaning of a person’s speech.46 Although
the defendant’s statements contemplated some sort of physical harm
to the complainant in the near future, the court found the statements
to be unsupported and more of a temporary loss of self-control.47
Human nature is indicative of how people can “lose their cool” over
certain events, so mere outbursts are not meant to be taken seriously.48 The court in Dietze recognized the importance in the constitutional protection of speech and held context was needed to prove the
defendant’s true intentions.49
1.

Looking At Context Through the Reasonable
Recipient – The Objective Test

Because the surrounding circumstances are critical in providing the context in which the speech occurred, the court in Brodeur also included an analysis of whether a reasonable recipient, familiar
with the context of the communication, would interpret Brodeur’s
words or conduct to constitute a true threat.50 This objective test provided the court with an unbiased analysis of a true threat, free of any
party’s hypersensitivities.51 This test was previously applied to the
facts in People v. Mitchell,52 in which the defendant called the complainant forty-five times and left her ten voice messages in which he
repeatedly threatened to kill her child.53 The complainant also stated
that the defendant pounded on her door for forty-five minutes threatening to kill her if she was with another man.54 After considering the
context, the court determined that the defendant’s conduct was a true
threat because a reasonable recipient would be alarmed by the repetitive communication, which served no legitimate purpose.55 Also, as a
matter of law, the court reasoned that the calls and messages were le46

Dietze, 549 N.E.2d at 1168-69.
Id. at 1169-70.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
51
See Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 623-24 (8th Cir. 2002) (supporting the reasonable recipient approach even though it disregards a person’s distinctive
sensitivity). “[T]he recipient's reaction still must be a reasonable one even if he or she suffers some unique sensitivity . . . .” Id.
52
No. 26317C–2009, 2009 WL 2929790 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. July 23, 2009).
53
Id. at *1.
54
Id.
55
Id. at *2, *3.
47
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gally sufficient on their face to constitute a true threat due to the language of the defendant’s statements.56 Therefore, aside from the
analysis as a matter of law, the reasonable recipient test proved helpful in the court’s contextual inquiry because it provided an objective
examination of a true threat.
2.

Did the Intended Recipient Believe It Was a
Threat? – The Subjective Test

The intended recipient test serves the opposite purpose of the
reasonable recipient test because the intended recipient’s own reaction to the conduct at issue is analyzed instead of examining whether
a reasonable person would be alarmed by the conduct or speech.57
Although numerous judicial opinions from both New York courts and
federal courts tend to apply the objective reasonable recipient test in
lieu of the subjective intended recipient test, the court in Brodeur applied the intended recipient test along with the reasonable recipient
test in order to further analyze the surrounding circumstances of the
volatile dispute.58 The court looked to United States v. Turner59 for
the intended recipient analysis. In Turner, the court considered
whether the defendant’s comments on his website, which stated three
federal judges should be killed, constituted a true threat.60 The defendant also posted photographs, work addresses, and room numbers
of the judges on his website along with the death threats. 61 Consequently, the judges were extremely alarmed by the substantial number of threats made by the defendant, and one judge stated his immediate reaction to the threats was “somebody was threatening to kill
me.”62 The court found the victimized judges’ testimony regarding
their reaction to the statements as highly relevant and not prejudicial
when used to determine whether a true threat was made.63 Therefore,
the intended recipient analysis provided further proof that the defend56

Id. at *3-4.
Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 778, 781, 782, 783.
58
Id.
59
720 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2013).
60
Id. at 413, 415-23.
61
Id. at 415-17, 423.
62
Id. at 416 (noting that the judges were reasonably worried because they were well
aware that the defendant referred on his website with admiration to Matthew Hale, who was
convicted of soliciting the murder of a judge the plaintiff jurists all knew).
63
Id. at 428-29.
57
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ant’s conduct had an alarming effect upon the complainants.64
D.

How a Mixed Question of Law and Fact
Determined Brodeur’s Protection and
Condemnation

The contextual approach applied by the court in Brodeur entailed an immense analysis of the objective reasonable recipient test
in order to ensure Brodeur’s free speech was not unjustly limited.65
Applying the objective test, the court in Brodeur held that a reasonable person in the position of Stuckey would not have taken the verbal
threats seriously because a reasonable person would have known of
Brodeur’s propensity to exaggerate issues in which he was involved.66 Also, a reasonable person would have known, or should
have known, that Brodeur would become enraged at Stuckey’s removing him from the premises, especially in the manner Stuckey removed Brodeur.67 Therefore, a reasonable recipient should have
known those verbal threats were mainly outbursts due to Brodeur’s
persona and the circumstances at hand.68
However, when applying the reasonable recipient test to the
poster Brodeur placed on Stuckey’s door, the court held a reasonable
person would find the poster to be threatening.69 A reasonable person
may think he could be arrested at any moment and perhaps suffer
physical harm if apprehended by the police.70 The ultimate difference between the verbal threat and the poster, under the reasonable
recipient analysis, was that the reasonable recipient would have
known, or should have known, that Brodeur’s verbal threats were exaggerated, whereas the poster presented an element of the unknown.71
64
Turner, 720 F.3d at 429 (“[P]roof of the effect of the alleged threat upon the addressee
is highly relevant.”) (quoting United States v. Davila, 461 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 2006)).
65
Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
66
Id. at 781.
67
Id. at 779-80. (noting that Stuckey removed Brodeur from the premises via self-help
and changed the locks to the space).
68
Id. at 780.
69
Id. at 784.
70
Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d 784 (stating that unlike Brodeur’s verbal threats, “in contrast to
our analysis of Defendant's verbal statements, Defendant's propensity for hyperbole and exaggeration, as known to Stuckey, does not save him from liability for the poster.”). After the
court concluded its contextual analysis, it found the surrounding events did not support First
Amendment protection for Brodeur. Id.
71
Id.
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Because viewers of the poster unfamiliar with the situation may have
taken action and called the police as the sign demanded, the poster
ultimately presented a threat to the complainant’s privacy72 and liberty.73
While basing a judicial analysis on one person’s belief is never a wholly sound process in our judicial system, it appeared to serve
a greater contextual purpose in Brodeur.74 Similar to the court in
Turner, the court in Brodeur used the intended recipient test to analyze Stuckey’s actual response to Brodeur’s conduct.75 The court in
Brodeur held the test did not create prejudicial analysis because other
elements of the contextual analysis already established the evidence
regarding what constituted a true threat.76 The court also stated that
Stuckey found the poster to be threatening because he was alarmed,
afraid, and annoyed upon seeing the poster on his door.77 Therefore,
the court believed that Brodeur’s intention was to annoy and alarm
Stuckey, and further instill fear in Stuckey because of the message on
the poster.78
III.

THE FEDERAL APPROACH

When determining whether a person’s questionable conduct is
afforded First Amendment protection, federal courts analyze various
proscribable conduct and speech statutes. Case law shows certain
courts applying a broad approach regarding what speech or conduct is
threatening and not protected, while other courts take a more narrow
approach in determining what makes certain speech or conduct a true
threat.79

72
See infra section IV.A-B for a discussion on privacy interests in relation to application
of proscribable speech/conduct statutes.
73
Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 784-85.
74
Id. at 779, 781-83.
75
Id. at 781-83. See Turner, 720 F.3d at 428-29 (noting the testimony of each victim
judge was given great weight by the court).
76
Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 778, 781-83.
77
Id. at 784 (noting how the court did not find Stuckey a “wholly credible” witness because he portrayed as much exaggeration as Brodeur displayed, but the court believed Stuckey’s testimony concerning his alarm caused by the poster was justified).
78
Id. at 784-85.
79
See infra section III.
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Does It Sound Like a Threat? It Is a Threat – The
Broad Application Approach

The court in United States v. Bellrichard80 applied the objective reasonable recipient test under a contextual true threat analysis to
find a broad scope of conduct and speech that was not protected under the First Amendment.81 The defendant in Bellrichard was convicted of sending threatening communications through the mail to
various government officials.82 The court in Bellrichard found the
reasonable recipient test of a contextual analysis to be sufficient when
determining whether one’s speech or conduct was appropriately proscribed.83 In this case, the defendant had a history of sending mailings to local officials regarding issues in which he was interested.84
One letter, which was addressed to the county attorney, stated, “you
will die,” and “[i]f they go to prison you’ll be dead in less than 7
months—so help me God!”85 The defendant did not deny that he
wrote the letters, but he argued the conduct was protected under the
First Amendment.86 The court did not agree with the defendant and
found the defendant’s mailings a true threat.87 The court primarily
focused on whether the mailings were a direct threat to the listener.88
In doing so, the court held that a reasonable person would believe
mailings sent to a person’s home are a true and direct threat. 89 The
contextual analysis, involving the reasonable recipient’s belief, led
the court to find that the First Amendment did not protect the defendant’s mailings.90
80

994 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1322, 1324.
82
Id. at 1319-21.
83
Id. at 1323-24.
84
Id. at 1320-21.
85
Bellrichard, 994 F.2d at 1322 (regarding the defendant’s intention to carry out physical
harm on the complainant if two juveniles, in a case he was interested in, were sentenced to
an adult prison).
86
Id. at 1322.
87
Id. at 1321-23 (“Bellrichard’s communications, viewed in context, would permit a reasonable jury to find that the communication conveys ‘a determination or intent to injure
presently or in the future.’ ”) (quoting Martin v. United States, 691 F.2d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir.
1982)). Also, Bellrichard admitted that he wrote the letters, and the specific address on the
mailings would show the threats were directed towards the listener. Id. at 1321-22.
88
Id. at 1321-23.
89
Bellrichard, 994 F.2d at 1321-23; see infra section IV.A (noting that direct threats are
connected to an invasion of privacy).
90
Bellrichard, 994 F.2d at 1322, 1324.
81
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What Actually Constitutes “Alarming” Speech? –
The Narrow Application Approach

In order to protect a person’s First Amendment rights, some
courts have narrowly applied proscribable speech or conduct statutes
only in cases where the conduct fell squarely within the language of
the statute.91 In Cohen v. California,92 the defendant was convicted
of the offense of disturbing the peace after he wore a jacket that bore
the statement “Fuck the Draft” in a courthouse where women and
children were present.93 The defendant stated that he was aware of
the message he displayed because it exemplified his true feelings towards the Vietnam War.94 On appeal, the Supreme Court applied a
thorough contextual analysis.95 First, the Court held that, as a matter
of law, the statement portrayed on the defendant’s jacket was considered socially condemnable speech, but in context, “[t]he defendant
did not engage in, nor threaten to engage in, nor did anyone as the result of his conduct in fact commit or threaten to commit any act of
violence.”96 The Court employed a narrow analysis when it interpreted the surrounding circumstances and held no person could consider the statement a direct personal threat because the jacket was not
addressed to anyone specifically.97 This narrow approach exemplified how the Supreme Court carefully scrutinized the issue of condemnable speech in relation to the First Amendment.98 Therefore, a
simple public display of unfavorable speech cannot be easily labeled
as proscribable speech.99
In United States v. Cassel,100 the Ninth Circuit applied the intended recipient test in its contextual true threat analysis in order to
narrowly interpret the classes of unprotected speech.101 The court
held that speech may be deemed a true threat upon proof that the

91

See supra section III.B.
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
93
Id. at 16.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 21-23.
96
Id. at 16-17.
97
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20-22 (“Those in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively
avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.”).
98
Id. at 19-21.
99
Id.
100
408 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2005).
101
Id. at 633.
92
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speaker subjectively intended the speech as a threat.102 The defendant in Cassel was convicted of interfering with a federal sale of land
by intimidation because he attempted to dissuade potential buyers
from purchasing property near his home.103 On appeal, the court stated a subjective intent analysis, not a negligence standard, is appropriate to determine if the defendant’s speech was protected under the
First Amendment.104 The court in Cassel supported its approach
when it discussed the jurisdiction’s usual application of the objective
reasonable person standard and stated, “[it] seems to suggest that the
First Amendment permits punishing a threat made with only negligence as to the statement’s threatening character.”105 This statement
reflects the court’s belief that an objective negligence standard cannot
justly support the stripping of a person’s First Amendment rights.106
Therefore, the court held that even though a reasonable person standard was acceptable in prior opinions, it may not adequately protect
one’s speech.107
While many courts held proscribable speech statutes constitutional when narrowly interpreted, other courts have found those statutes unconstitutional on their face while conducting a true threat
analysis. Although the facts in Vives v. City of New York108 were
similar to the facts in Bellrichard, the two cases had drastically different holdings.109 The court in Vives held New York’s Aggravated
Harassment statute was facially unconstitutional to the extent the
statute prohibited communications made with intent to annoy or
alarm.110 Similar to the defendant’s writings in Bellrichard, the defendant in Vives sent a politician written materials in which he admit102

Id.
Id. at 624-25 (stating that complainant testified “Cassel told him ‘that if I [Goodin]
tried to build anything on Lot 107, that it would definitely burn. He would see to that. That
if I left anything there, it would be stolen, vandalized. He would see to that.’ ”).
104
Id. at 629-30.
105
Cassel, 408 F.3d at 629.
106
Id. at 631 (“Only intentional threats [that] are criminally punishable [are consistent]
with the First Amendment.”) (emphasis added).
107
Id. at 628-30 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal.
of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e observed that ‘the requirement
of intent to intimidate cures whatever risk there might be of overbreadth.’ ”)). See also supra section III.B for a discussion of Vives v. City of New York, 305 F. Supp. 2d 289
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), and infra section IV.B for a discussion of vagueness.
108
305 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 405 F.3d 115 (2d Cir.
2004).
109
Id.; Bellrichard, 994 F.2d at 1319-21.
110
Vives, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 289.
103
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tedly intended to alarm the recipient with materials concerning the
Jewish faith and current world events.111 If the subjective intent
analysis as stated in Cassel were applied, the court could have found
the defendant guilty of intending to threaten the complainant.112
However, the primary focus of the court in Vives was the evaluation
of the statute itself, specifically the court’s criticism of the breadth
and vagueness of its language.113 Unlike the court in Bellrichard, the
court in Vives did not place much emphasis on the mailings being addressed and sent to the complainant114 as a direct and personal true
threat.115
The court in Vives criticized the statute by attempting to apply
the language of the Aggravated Harassment Statute to the case before
it. The court noted how the complainant and the arresting officer
admitted that the materials in the envelope contained nothing threatening per se; therefore, the defendant could not have “annoyed” or
“alarmed” the complainant with his mailings.116 Further, the court
stated the only materials that constitute a true threat fall into the categories of defamation, incitement, obscenity, or child pornography.117
The court’s criticism showed that the language of the statute created
an immense gray area,118 and that a person may not easily know
which kind of conduct is proscribable.119 Given the ambiguity of the
111

Id. at 293-94 (“The mailings include Vives’s handwritten and typed statements, as well
as copies of stories and other items taken from general circulation newspapers. Vives mails
the materials to ‘people of the Jewish faith with the intent to alarm them about current world
events that have been prophesied in the Bible, including the unification of the European
countries into a single political and military entity.’ ”). For more information on the mailings defendant sent, see Bellrichard, 994 F.2d at 1320.
112
Cassel, 408 F.3d at 633.
113
Vives, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 299-302.
114
Id. at 294 (noting only the envelope was addressed to the complainant specifically and
not the defendant’s mailings). In contrast to the defendant in Vives, the defendant in
Bellrichard specifically addressed the county attorney in his postcards. Bellrichard, 994
F.2d at 1321-22.
115
Vives, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 294.
116
Id. (noting the arresting officer’s complainant report stated the defendant’s mailings
did not have threatening wording within it. The mailings were mainly political and religious
statements and photocopy of a cutout newspaper article).
117
Vives, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 298-99 (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234,
246 (2002)).
118
Id.
119
Id. at 300-01 (“The fact that Vives was arrested pursuant to section 240.30(1) for engaging in conduct that is firmly protected by the First Amendment, and that he no longer
feels free to put his name and address on his mailings, exemplifies why section 240.30(1)
cannot be reconciled with the First Amendment. Section 240.30(1) is therefore unconstitu-

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/8

14

Dolzani: Can I Be Arrested for Being Annoying?

2014]

CAN I BE ARRESTED FOR BEING ANNOYING?

999

statute as a whole, the court held that no form of analysis, as a matter
of law, fact, or both, could determine when one’s speech would cross
the line from protected to criminal under the statute.120
Federal courts have used varying applications of proscribable
speech statutes in which some courts found a broad category of unprotected speech or conduct, while other courts went beyond the language of the statute to narrowly limit what conduct is not afforded
First Amendment protection.121 Finally, the court in Vives held no
method of the true threat analysis could justify a proscribable speech
or conduct statute when its language is vague and unconstitutional on
its face.122 Even though there is a split among the federal courts in
regard to what speech or conduct is proscribable, this split shows the
continuous struggle of the courts to clearly define the line between
protected and proscribed speech.
IV.

THE NEW YORK APPROACH: HOW A RIGHT TO PRIVACY
MAY JUSTIFY A LIMITATION ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Regarding the right to free speech, the New York Constitution
mirrors the right exemplified in the United States Constitution. “Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of
the press.”123 While the New York Constitution proclaims every citizen has a fundamental right to free speech, it also declares every person is responsible for the abuse of that right.124 This language specifically reveals the limits on the right to free speech, and it is within the
discretion of the New York courts to determine how far to extend this
right.125
A.

PRIVACY INTERESTS IN A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

The majority of New York courts have held the Aggravated
Harassment statute constitutional, but only when narrowly interprettional to the extent it prohibits communications, made with the intent to annoy or alarm.”).
120
Id. at 299-302.
121
Supra section III.A-B.
122
Supra section III.B.
123
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).
124
Id.
125
Id.
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ed.126 The New York approach includes a consideration of a person’s
right to privacy, along with a contextual true threat analysis in order
to determine if certain speech or conduct transfers from protected to
proscribed.127
In People v. Smith,128 the court analyzed the context of the
speech in addition to the defendant’s effect on the complainant’s privacy interests in order to determine whether the defendant communicated a true threat.129 In this case, the defendant first called a police
officer regarding a complaint that he made, and the officer stated the
manner was civil, not criminal.130 However, the defendant continued
to call the station, and within a three hour time period, the defendant
had called the officer twenty-seven times.131 Under a true threat
analysis, the court narrowly applied the statute and held that the defendant’s conduct fell within the “hard core”132 of the statute and that
any vagueness in the statute’s language was not an issue in this situation.133 While the defendant had initially called the police desk with
a legitimate complaint, the court held that the repetition of the phone
calls entailed harassing, not legitimate, conduct.134 The court then
analyzed the complainant’s privacy interests in addition to the defendant’s specific conduct in the situation.135 Because the defendant’s actions served no legitimate communication and constituted a
repeated event in a short period of time, the complainant’s right to
privacy was “invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”136 Therefore, once the defendant unreasonably invaded the complainant’s privacy, the defendant lost his First Amendment protection.137

126

See infra section IV.A.
See infra section IV.A; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21-22. Although a consideration of a person’s privacy interest is an important factor in New York, some federal opinions discuss privacy concerns in relation to what speech or conduct would constitute a true threat. Id.
128
392 N.Y.S.2d 968 (App. Term 1977).
129
Id. at 969-71.
130
Id. at 969.
131
Id. 969-70.
132
Id. at 970 (“[I]t is enough to say that ‘even if the outermost boundaries of (subdivision
one are) imprecise, any such uncertainty has little relevance here, where appellant's conduct
falls squarely within the ‘hard core’ of the statute's proscription.’ ”) (quoting Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973)).
133
Smith, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 970-71.
136
Id. (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21).
137
Id. at 970-71.
127
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The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Shack138 also
analyzed the complainant’s privacy interests to conclude the defendant’s conduct was not protected.139 The defendant in Shack called the
complainant, his cousin and a psychiatrist, one hundred and eightyfive times between December and May with threatening messages.140
The court held that “an individual’s right to communicate must be
balanced against the recipient’s right ‘to be let alone’ in places in
which the latter possesses a right of privacy.”141 The court went on to
state, “[u]nder some circumstances, the privacy right may ‘plainly
outweigh’ the free speech rights of an intruder.”142 In regard to the
defendant’s phone calls, the court stated that the complainant had a
right to be free from unwanted phone calls, and this reasoning should
serve as deterrence for people to not employ the telephone for “unjustifiable motives.”143 Therefore, when substantial privacy interests are
invaded, the right to privacy may outweigh a person’s right to free
speech.
Although a person’s right to privacy is given weighty consideration in condemnable speech or conduct cases in New York, the
courts may still apply a true threat analysis in these cases. In People
v. Thompson,144 the court’s contextual true threat analysis coupled
with an examination of the complainant’s privacy interests led to a
more narrow interpretation of what constituted a true threat. 145 In
Thompson, the defendant called the complainant numerous times in
one month and on one occasion called the complainant and stated “I
am on my way over there,” and, shortly thereafter, the defendant was
outside complainant’s residence.146 The court applied a contextual
approach under its true threat analysis when it stated plain “annoy138

658 N.E.2d 706 (N.Y. 1995).
Id. at 706, 710-11.
140
Id. at 709-10 (noting that the messages stated the defendant would set fire to the complainant’s father’s home and the defendant would call the Michigan licensing board to have
complainant’s psychologist’s license revoked).
141
Id. at 710 (citing Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736,
(1970)).
142
Id.
143
Shack, 658 N.E.2d at 710-11 (noting the justification for the proscribable speech or
conduct statute. The statute may limit a person’s free speech, but is constitutional because it
is narrowly tailored and protects its citizens from unwanted phone calls) (quoting United
States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1978)).
144
905 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Crim. Ct. 2010).
145
Id. at 494, 496-97.
146
Id. at 453.
139

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

17

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 4 [2014], Art. 8

1002

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

ing” speech could not be the sole basis for criminal prosecution.147 In
regard to the defendant’s phone call, which pointed to the temporal
proximity between the communication and the defendant’s action upon it, the court narrowly interpreted the statute and held the incident
was “facially insufficient to establish that the defendant made a genuine threat with the intent to annoy, threaten or alarm the complainant.”148 Concerning the complainant’s privacy interest, the court held
that the defendant’s phone call did not constitute an invasion of privacy because there was a lack of evidence concerning the frequency
and nature of the defendant’s calls.149 For the court, the overall incident was an isolated event rather than an actual threatening situation.150 Therefore, the facts in Thompson represented how a seemingly concrete example of a true threat which is determined to be
protected speech when analyzed using a contextual inquiry.151
The protection of one’s right to privacy is highly relevant in
determining which conduct crosses the protected speech or conduct
barrier. If a court concluded a person’s privacy interests were substantially invaded, it proves how the wrongdoer’s conduct was not
meant to be protected, enjoyed, or praised. Expectation of the right
to privacy is a fundamental belief which many people share and want
to protect. First Amendment protection should not extend to the
point where it hinders another basic civil liberty.
B.

Overbroad Equals Unconstitutional?

Even though the majority of New York State courts have held
the Aggravated Harassment statute constitutional, the court in People
v. Dupont152 held the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the
facts of the case.153 The defendant in Dupont was charged under the
147

Id. at 459.
Id. at 460-61 (noting that in order to prove a violation of the Aggravated Harassment
statute, a communication must have actually occurred, and holding the only communication
proven, the defendant’s statement that “I’m on my way over there,” was not a sufficient
communication under the statute).
149
Thompson, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97 (“With no further description as to the nature of
the calls and/or the complainant’s interactions with the Defendant, the Court does not find
that the misdemeanor information is facially sufficient to show that the complainant was an
unwilling listener.”).
150
Id. at 461.
151
Id. at 494, 496-97.
152
486 N.Y.S.2d 169 (App. Div. 1985).
153
Id.
148
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statute after he distributed a magazine, which claimed that his former
attorney was a homosexual, and the complainant alleged that it portrayed his professional status in an unappealing light.154 Although the
defendant distributed the magazines around the complainant’s town
and even left numerous copies in front of the complainant’s office,155
the court did not believe the complainant’s privacy interests were invaded, nor was the defendant’s conduct proscribed under the statute.156 The court supported its findings when it compared the defendant’s conduct with the conduct of the defendant in Smith.157 The
defendant’s conduct in Smith fell within the hard core of the statute’s
proscriptions because the repeated phone calls were considered harassing conduct.158 In contrast, in Dupont, the defendant’s mere distribution of literature did not invade the complainant’s privacy interests or pose a true threat.159
Further, the court in Dupont challenged the actual language of
the statute when it analyzed the statute’s constitutionality as applied
to the case.160 The court’s concern with the protection of First
Amendment rights was apparent, and it stated, “First Amendment
freedoms must be given weighty consideration in balancing them
against the interests underlying challenged statutes.”161 Similar to the
court’s concern in Vives, the court in Dupont was troubled with the
vagueness of the statute’s language, which addressed, “[a] communication in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm.”162 The court
broke down the very essence of the statute when it questioned whether the content of the communication, claims of homosexuality, inter
alia, was condemned, or whether the actual form of the communication, magazine distribution, was proscribed.163 Also, the court exhibited skepticism about the statute’s determination of annoyance—how
154

Id. at 171-72 (noting the defendant called the complainant on one occasion stating he
was coming out with a book soon which was an “exposé of the attorney's alleged homosexual lifestyle, replete with cartoons and pictures.”).
155
Id. at 172.
156
Id. at 174.
157
Dupont, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 173-74; see also Smith, 392 N.Y.S.2d 968; see supra section
IV.A.
158
Dupont, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 174.
159
Id. at 174, 175 (“Although it may be argued that the magazine was obscene, this is neither an obscenity prosecution nor an obscenity statute.”).
160
Id. at 174-77.
161
Id. at 175.
162
Id. at 172-76 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30(1) (McKinney 2012)).
163
Dupont, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 174-75.
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does one measure annoyance to be compliable with the statute?164
With these proposed questions on how to reconcile the ambiguity
within the statute, the court determined that the application of the
statute to this particular defendant’s conduct could not be justified
under the First Amendment.165
V.

CONCLUSION

It is evident from case law and modern societal norms that the
protection of one’s free speech under the First Amendment is a right
that will always be fought for, analyzed, and praised. The balance
between the law’s focus on policing and protecting people from unlawful conduct, and a person’s right to exert his or her First Amendment freedom never falls at a perfect equilibrium.
Specifically regarding New York’s Aggravated Harassment
statute, both federal and New York courts have dealt with the reality
of the conflict between the statute and the First Amendment. While
cases such as Vives and Dupont declared the statute facially unconstitutional, other courts articulated a need for a proscribable speech or
conduct statute, but held it is narrowly applicable. Although the language condemning “annoying” or “alarming” speech does suggest a
level of ambiguity, a contextual true threat analysis will determine
whether one’s speech or conduct goes beyond a protected act, such as
being an “annoying” telemarketer and whether it becomes a
proscribable act.
The test set out in Brodeur has proven to be the most efficient
test, when compared with other cases, to determine whether a person’s speech is truly threatening. Not only did the court determine
whether the defendant’s conduct constituted a true threat as a matter
of law, the court also undertook an intensive contextual analysis of
fact in order to determine the meaning of the verbal statements and
the poster.166 Unlike some cases previously discussed, the court in
Brodeur heavily relied on what the intended recipient of the conduct

164

Id. at 174.
Id. at 174-76 (“It cannot be doubted that a statute drawn in so narrow a form as to
criminally punish one who describes another as a homosexual . . . would be unconstitutional.”). Because there are other civil remedies for the defendant’s type of conduct, such as a
defamation action, the court held the defendant’s conduct was not justified as proscribable
speech unprotected by the First Amendment. Id.
166
Supra section II.C.1-2.
165
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interpreted the behavior to mean.167 When determining context, it is
appropriate to evaluate whether the actual complainant reasonably
believed the defendant’s conduct to be a true threat. Many cases involving New York’s Aggravated Harassment statute and other
proscribable speech or conduct statutes perceptibly demonstrate a rather unpleasant relationship between the defendant and the complainant. Therefore, in the analysis of these cases, the intended recipient’s
interpretation along with that of the objective reasonable person
standard would provide a more exhaustive examination of the incident, and determine why these two opposing parties behaved in such
a way.
The law is not blind to the propensities of human nature.
Courts realize our imperfections may cause us to be unreasonable on
occasion, and that realization may save a person from being convicted of a criminal offense and stripped of his or her First Amendment
rights. However, as stated in many cases, not all conduct deserves
First Amendment protection. In order to create a more uniform approach to defining the line between protected and criminal conduct,
there needs to be a continuing effort by the courts to perform a meticulous contextual analysis of the circumstances to prove whether
the incident was a simple flare up of one’s temper or a serious and
personal threat.
Allison E. Dolzani

167
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